Air Force Master Labor Agreement
The judge noted that Ogden was not required to negotiate the mobility team`s medium-term proposal initiated by Local 1592, as the deputy of the parties limited local negotiations to a single addendum that had already been concluded. The judge noted that new negotiations at the activity level could only take place by mutual agreement between Council 214 and the AFLC. The judge noted that while Council 214 may have delegated medium-term bargaining authority to Shoell, this delegation had not been forwarded to management. According to the judge, there was nothing in the files to show that the AFLC had given Ogden the power to negotiate in the medium term. The judge concluded that “Ogden was not obligated to bargain with the union [Local 1592].” Id. at p. 10 (footnote omitted). In the Authority`s decision on pre-trial detention, Internal Revenue Service, 29 FLRA 162 (1987), the Authority concluded that the duty to bargain in good faith imposed by the Statute obliges an agency to negotiate, during the term of a collective agreement, on negotiable proposals initiated by the union on matters not dealt with in the agreement and not by the union during the negotiation of the agreement. have been repealed clearly and unambiguously.
The Internal Revenue Service was issued following Local`s request for negotiations in 1592 and Ogden`s subsequent rejection. The Advocate General, in consultation with the judge, states that the contractual defence is “vulnerable”. Id. at p. 12. However, the Advocate General challenges the application of the law by the judge. Since the Internal Revenue Service was issued prior to the judge`s decision, the Advocate General submits that it exercises control. Id. The Advocate General disagrees with the judge`s conclusion that Ogden`s refusal to negotiate did not violate the law, as the wording of the AMLA discussed above prevented Local 1592 from entering into medium-term negotiations. The Advocate General states that “the judge erred in ruling that the language of the contract prevented the local from entering into negotiations.” Id. The defendant is an agency within the meaning of Article 7103(a)(3) of the Staff Regulations.
(G.C. Ex. 1 (f).) A trade union is a workers` organisation within the meaning of Article 7103(a)(4) of the Staff Regulations. (Id.). The trade union is the exclusive representative of a unit of workers capable of collective bargaining in the defendant`s establishment. (Id.). 3 The use of the word “may” is intended to convey its speculative meaning, not its permissive meaning. Clarifying whether work related to a collective agreement containing a restriction on the use of official time may be performed by a union representative working at official time in accordance with a second collective agreement is an issue that the authority must address if it is properly presented by facts that are not present in the case. Since the request to negotiate the selection of the medium-term mobility team was not made by the exclusive representative or his representative, and because it was not demonstrated that the exclusive representative had been delegated to Local 1592 to negotiate the assignments of the mobility team, Ogden was not obliged to negotiate the assignments of the mobility team with Local 1592.
Therefore, since Ogden was not obliged to negotiate with Local in 1592, he did not engage in unfair labor practice when he refused to do so. However, the judge noted that Local 1592 could be excluded from medium-term negotiations on any issue. Judge`s decision at 6-7. The judge noted that in consolidated collective bargaining units, such as the unit represented here, which represents several activities of the AFLC, the agency may refuse to negotiate with a local union unless the parties have agreed to allow additional bargaining at the activity level. The judge noted that the parties in this case had agreed that only one additional agreement would be negotiated at the activity level and that a supplementary agreement had already been negotiated between Ogden and Local in 1592. The judge also noted that the parties to section 33.02 c. had agreed to authorize local negotiations only by mutual agreement between Council 214 and the AFLC. Moreover, in this case, the protocol provides no evidence that Patti Williams prepared and executed the letters, citing the arbitration, while working on a formal basis in accordance with her status as a steward under the DLA Framework Agreement. In fact, the statement by Williams and union president Tom Scott was that she had not prepared the letters when she was on official time and that this statement had not been challenged or refuted. (Tr. 31, 37-38, 49) More importantly, it was the testimony of John Pugh, the respondent`s representative, who rejected the letters on the basis of arbitration, that it did not matter to him whether or not Ms Williams was at the official time, whether it was her status as a representative under the DLA`s employment contract that prevented her from: work on issues related to the CMA Agreement. (Hrsg.
63, 66-67) If a collective agreement contains restrictions on the use of official working time, a union representative may be prevented from working on matters relating to that agreement while in official time under another agreement.3 However, these are not the facts presented in this case, and the excessively broad exclusion of the qualification imposed by the defendant`s representative will not be legally supported, and at the time of rejection, no mention of such a power was made. or at the hearing. Given that the appointment of Patti Williams as the official union representative one hundred percent (100%) under the DLA`s employment contract did not prevent her from supporting Local 987 in any other capacity, no affirmative defence was put forward by the respondent and the refusal to recognize a designated union representative was against the law. Aflc and Council 214 are parties to a Framework Agreement (MLA). .
